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I
n the spring of 2003, a dozen economists quietly gath-
ered in a hotel conference room in downtown St. Louis
to talk about the state of their profession. They shared
a general malaise. In their view, academic economics had
become too narrow and too rigid, and scholarly articles too
abstract, technical, and disconnected from the real world.
“We had a sense that economists were failing in an impor-
tant sense to bring economic insight to bear on public
understanding and public policy,” recalls Dan Klein, a 
professor at George Mason University in Fairfax, Va., who
organized the gathering.
Out of this meeting was born a new economics journal  —
Econ Journal W atch, with its premiere issue in 2004.
Published three times a year and edited by Klein, the journal
consists mainly of refereed “Comments” essays that critique
articles in other economics journals, sometimes questioning
their data, other times their premises or their logic. The
stated mission is to watch “the journals for inappropriate
assumptions, weak chains of argument, phony claims of 
relevance, and omissions of pertinent truths.” 
To be clear, Klein and his fellow journal organizers belong
to a specific ideological strain. (And there are plenty in the
profession who do not share their malaise. After all, the
mainstream is still, well, “the mainstream.”) Klein calls them
the “Smith-Hayek-Friedmans,” after Adam Smith, author of
The Wealth of Nations and generally regarded as the founding
father of economics; Friedrich Hayek, a Nobel Prize winner
known for his defense of free markets and contributions to
what became known as the “Austrian School” of economics;
and Milton Friedman, another Nobel Prize winner whose
work became synonymous with the neoclassical “Chicago
School” and whose essays galvanized public interest in eco-
nomic principles.
Those who follow in this tradition are pretty close to
being mainstream economists, though perhaps even more
free-market tilting and not as technically oriented as those
who preside over the field’s top journals. It is not surprising
that their journal is at heart a critique of the economic
orthodoxy. But it is only one of many critiques, some from
the far end of the ideological spectrum and others rather
close to the middle.
Klein and his cohorts want to know why more econo-
mists aren’t addressing the Big Questions. Where are the
plain-spoken economists of yore who helped guide public
opinion? As Klein puts it: “There’s this lingering question of
people of my ilk — why isn’t there a Milton Friedman
today?” 
Questions from other camps also abound. As is natural
during turbulent times such as these, many questions 
focus on macroeconomics — the study of economy-wide
phenomena. Income inequality is widening and more
domestic jobs are being lost to free trade. The recent credit
market turmoil provides numerous examples of borrowers
and lenders making poor choices. Is economics too set in 
its ways to consider alternative explanations for how 
individuals and firms make decisions?
It’s a fair question. But it would be unfair to suggest that
it is going unanswered. As it is, many view the supposed fail-
ings of high-level economics as greatly exaggerated. Is
macroeconomics too theoretical? Perhaps in some cases, but
it’s unlikely you can devise workable policy proposals with-
out first establishing a solid theory about how people will
react to those new policies. Too much math? Well, the fact is
that economics is a quantitative field. Especially for the pur-
poses of conducting macroeconomic policy, quantitative
judgments are essential. Helen Tauchen, associate chair of
the economics department at the University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill, says: “The inherently dynamic nature
of economic decisions, the statistical difficulties in using
nonlaboratory data, and the complication of handling inter-
actions among strategic agents all require nontrivial
mathematical approaches.”
In this issue of Region Focus, we describe how economics
is trying to get at the Big Questions — the way the field is
embarking on a reorganization, how its members are com-
municating with each other and nonspecialists, and how
their research focuses are shifting.  
By no means is this an exhaustive exploration of the state
of economics, and the following historical summary is just
that — a heavily abridged and simplified review to help place
these articles in historical context. We aim instead to cap-
ture the uniqueness and — most of all — the enthusiasm
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debate among economists is in some ways livelier than ever,
with universities experiencing a heyday in applications and
enrollment; blogs providing informal venues for discourse;
and exciting new research frontiers beginning to produce
real results.
ABrief History of Economic Thought
In the beginning, there was Adam Smith. The “classical
model” of the economy that is attributed to Smith — as well
as David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill  — assumed that mar-
kets exhibited perfect competition; that people make
decisions based on real, not nominal, values; and that these
people are basically the same in their preferences and eco-
nomic behavior. Obviously, this was an oversimplification
that limited the model’s reach. For instance, in the classical
model there are no business cycles — the historical boom-
bust sequence of economic fluctuations. Output is
determined by changes in aggregate supply, which in turn is
often adversely influenced by government interference.
Hence, classical economists were advocates of a “laissez-
faire,” or hands-off, approach.
While the next 200 years were eventful, the classical
model maintained its dominance. But with the Great
Depression came great change in the prevailing economic
paradigm. In 1936, John Maynard Keynes published The
General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. Few works
have so shaken up their disciplines. Among the differences
between Keynes and his predecessors was that he provided a
model which encompassed both the macroeconomy — an
aggregate description of how the economy works — and the
microeconomy. He also put short-term conditions at the
forefront, famously remarking, “In the long run we are all
dead.”
The key to what became known as the Keynesian model
was aggregate demand. (Over the years, you see some clear
differences in beliefs between Keynes and the practitioners
who call themselves Keynesians.) Keynesians relied on the
so-called IS-LM model, which showed how demand was
impacted by changes in investment and savings (IS) and
changes in liquidity and money (LM). In this model, shifts in
consumption levels as well as investment can have an effect
on demand. 
Keynes himself thought people formed their expecta-
tions based on “animal spirits” and not economic
fundamentals. As a result, aggregate demand tended to move
erratically along with the mood of the marketplace.
Keynesians also believed policymakers had several key
tools with which to bring about changes in consumption
and, by extension, aggregate demand. Fiscal policy — raising
or cutting taxes — is one way that Keynesians believed the
economy could be fine-tuned. 
Keynes also provided an answer to why the Great
Depression occurred: High expectations about the future
occurred in the midst of a stock market bubble and the
economy’s general overproduction of goods. This in turn
reduced investment and popped the stock market bubble.
Wall Street’s crash lowered wealth and spurred low expecta-
tions about the future of the economy, both of which had
the effect of further reducing investment and consumption.
In sum, aggregate demand collapsed. To reverse the 
situation, Keynesians advocated stimulating demand via
government spending.
Keynesians ruled the policy world for at least two
decades after World War II. But then the monetarists, led 
by Milton Friedman, entered the picture. The monetarists
from the University of Chicago held that changes in the
money supply were the real driver of business cycles because
of their ability to change aggregate demand. 
Where Keynesians believed that prices and
wages were somewhat “sticky” because mar-
kets were not perfectly competitive,
monetarists believed that expectations
about the future were stickier. These “sticky
expectations” were the main culprit in
upsetting the process of getting supply and
demand back into equilibrium. It was this
backward-looking nature of expectations
that allowed a loosening of monetary policy
to have (temporary) stimulative effects on
real production and consumption in the
economy. But that effect would wear off as
expectations eventually caught up with
increases in realized inflation. Thus, the 
central bank’s main job should be to avoid
causing inflation by tightly controlling the
money supply. From monetarists came the
maxim: “Inflation is always and everywhere a
monetary phenomenon.”
In the mid-1970s Robert Lucas articulat-
ed his “rational expectations” hypothesis,
which has endured as arguably the most
influential contribution to macroeconomic
theory ever since then. Lucas tended to
agree with monetarists, but he added the
notion that people form their expectations
of the future by using all available informa-
tion — they are forward-looking more 
often than they are backward-looking. 
He also suggested that they are unlikely to
make predictable, systematic errors. While 
a monetarist would have assumed people
would react to inflation only upon 
experiencing it, a disciple of rational expec-
tations believes people will see that
expansionary monetary policy could lead to
higher inflation, and thus immediately
incorporate that information into their
financial behavior.
The famous example is a football game —
data show that throwing passes leads to
more touchdowns than simply running the
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RF_SUM_08  9/11/08  11:47 AM  Page 13ball. So should a team simply throw the ball all the time? Of
course not, because the defense would respond with new
formations to quash a pass-only offense. The Lucas critique
at heart pointed out what should have been obvious:
People’s behavior will change as policy changes.
From the perspective that markets contain much imper-
fect information or firms and people face constraints on
their borrowing, for example, the rational expectations 
theory provides a useful framework for understanding the
economy. More to the point, it remedies the main problem
with previous economic theories.
Closely associated with the rational expectations
approach is “real business cycle” theory, developed by even-
tual Nobel Prize winners Finn Kydland and Edward C.
Prescott, and which held much sway during the 1980s. 
So-called RBC models emphasized the importance of the
supply side of the economy in determining output. They also
drew heavily from microeconomic principles — the rational
individual responding to incentives who tries to maximize
the “utility” of his marginal decisions over time as well as the
tendency of markets to move toward equilibrium. In RBC
models, prices and wages change rapidly.
The New Keynesians arrived in force by the late 1980s to
build upon the neoclassical/rational expectations/RBC
approaches. New Keynesians come in several forms, but in
general they believe that sticky (or slow-changing) prices and
wages are the key to understanding the effects of monetary
policy, which in turn is central to economic output. New
Keynesian models also take into account the possibility of
both demand- and supply-driven recessions.
Where Are We Now?
For macroeconomists, a leading notion is that they have
achieved a “new neoclassical synthesis,” a term coined in a
1997 paper by former Richmond Fed economist Marvin
Goodfriend and Robert King, a Richmond Fed visiting
scholar. In the 1960s, Goodfriend and King argued, the orig-
inal synthesis included the acceptance of the common
optimization tools of microeconomics, a belief in the power
of sticky prices, and the need to provide useful macroeco-
nomic policy advice. 
The new synthesis marries Keynesian short-run demand
policies with classical let-the-market-decide microeconomic
policies. It combines the most compelling parts of
Keynesian and classical models with rational expectations,
monetarist, RBC, and New Keynesian theories. “There are
new dynamic microeconomic foundations for macroeco-
nomics,” Goodfriend and King wrote. “These common
methodological ideas are implemented in models that range
from the flexible, small models of academic research to the
new rational-expectations policy model of the Federal
Reserve Board.”
One thing that should be clear at this point is that the
dominant economic paradigm has shifted significantly over
the years, sometimes abruptly, and that at any given time many
economists disagree with the prevailing economic paradigm. 
The economy is, at this writing, experiencing a down-
turn of, as yet, an undetermined length and magnitude.
Macroeconomic models may do very well at theoretically
evaluating the effects of various policies, but how confident
is anyone, including the people who build the most widely
used models, that they can really help forecast or understand
the economy? 
At a more fundamental level, today’s questions have 
centered on the perceived rigidity of the economic ortho-
doxy. Last year, the New York Times looked at how some
economists felt like outcasts after raising doubts about the
uniform virtues of free markets. Alan Blinder, a former
Federal Reserve Board governor, was quoted as saying  that
“there is too much ideology” and that economics was too
often “a triumph of theory over fact.” Economics blogs
spent weeks debating an article in The Nation that spot-
lighted the “heterodox” wing of economics and described
the mainstream as smug and inflexible to new, possibly bet-
ter ideas. In an April op-ed piece in the Boston Globe,
economist Richard Thaler and legal scholar Cass Sunstein
used the mortgage crisis as an example of the failure of eco-
nomic orthodoxy. After the fact, it’s clear that credit was
extended to all sorts of people who shouldn’t have received
any. In response, Thaler and Sunstein favor the emerging
field of “behavioral economics,” in which “the robot-like
creatures who populate standard economic theories are
replaced with real human beings.”
Some of the criticism is to be expected, both in terms of
its timing (accompanying the downturn) and from its
sources. For example, John Willoughby, chairman of the 
economics department at American University in
Washington, D.C., wonders why so many economists seem
to ignore growing bodies of research. “The rational expecta-
tions, dynamic programming models seem to me to bear
very little connection to what economists actually do when
trying to stabilize the economy,” Willoughby says. “There
are a lot of interesting things being done in behavioral and
experimental and game theory that challenge the notion
that there’s one sort of steady state to which the economy 
is heading — not that most economists strictly believed 
that but even as a theoretical framework I think that’s
breaking down.”
On the other hand, someone like Alan Blinder is hardly
out of the mainstream. Nor is Thomas Nechyba, chairman
of Duke University’s economics department, who worries
that macroeconomics in particular has become too theoret-
ical. “There is a new paradigm in the more micro-based way
we are doing macro. But if it can’t succeed in explaining
actual data, the stylized facts that are out there, and do it in
more than a calibrated model with replicated facts — I think
it’s going to be in trouble.”
Tom Humphrey, who retired from the Richmond Fed in
2004, is a historian of economics who remains engaged in the
profession. Humphrey says he takes a relatively optimistic
view. By no means is economics in crisis, he says, and one
should not be overly restrictive in defining what a “main-
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omist might agree that in the short run people can behave
irrationally and make mistakes. 
Watchdogs
One of the traditional mechanisms that defines the intellec-
tual currents in economics are the journals. As in other
academic disciplines, article submissions are vetted by other
economists before acceptance. The big journals — American
Economic Review, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, and Econometrica to name a few — natu-
rally tend to accept papers that agree with the worldview of
the referees. That’s not an easy thing to change so it may
take awhile for generally accepted paradigms to shift as well.
But what can accelerate the shift is an open, intellectual
exchange of the ideas, theories, and methods that appear in
the leading economics journals. At least that is what Klein
and his cohorts at Econ Journal W atch hope. Klein does not
Spring/Summer 2008 • Region Focus 15
Q&A: General Equilibrium Models
General equilibrium models are the preferred tool of many
macroeconomists today. To get a better understanding of these
models, we asked Richmond Fed economist Kartik Athreya 
to explain.
What’s a standard general equilibrium model?
General equilibrium refers to situations in which the desires 
of consumers and producers for all commodities under 
study are simultaneously reconciled. A standard general equi-
librium model is the “competitive” one, where consumers and
producers meet in markets in which both parties assume that
the prices of goods are beyond their control. A competitive
general equilibrium occurs when we’ve found a set of prices
that leads households to demand precisely the amount that
firms wish to produce at those prices.
At its heart, a general equilibrium model is a collection of
two objects: One is a set of assumptions about the behaviors of
households and firms, and the other is an “equilibrating” insti-
tution, which is how the actions of individual actors restrict
each other. The behavior assumed for households is that they
are utility maximizing — they make themselves as well-off as
possible given their constraints. For firms, it’s profit maximiza-
tion. All general equilibrium models are going to have these
two ingredients. The big achievement of competitive equi-
librium theory was to show that “usually” — if households and
firms took prices as given when optimizing and paid no 
attention to anything but these prices — supply would equal
demand in all markets.
What’s a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model?
It’s any general equilibrium model in which the actors must
make decisions over time in an uncertain environment. 
Firms look forward to the future and households think about
retirement — that’s the dynamic part of the model.
“Stochastic” refers to the fact that economic actors in the
model face uncertainty. And equilibrium in this case refers to
the presumption that supply equals demand in markets for
goods traded both in the present as well as in the future. 
In models where prices equilibrate competing interests, 
people’s expectations of the future values of prices must be
specified. In standard DSGE models, these expectations are 
assumed to be correct — not always, but on average.
In the context of monetary policy, people have started
employing these models because they think expectations of
future inflation are something important to guide the behavior
of actors. These models take a big step toward escaping the
Lucas critique (which states that relying on historical data is
misleading because people will change their behavior based on
changes in policy) because the actors are modeled as always
reacting optimally to policy changes.
What do you feed into these models?
In the model, the attitudes of households and the capabilities
of firms will be given mathematical representations that are
summarized in a set of numbers that we call “parameters.” 
For example, the way that people value future consumption
relative to current consumption, or how averse to risk house-
holds are. In assigning numerical values to parameters, we let
agents operate under current policies and then ask, “What
numbers must be chosen for the parameters such that the equi-
librium behavior of the model matches what we see in the real
world?” This strategy is called calibration.
What do you get out of these models?
You predict outcomes for all the objects that the actors in the
model care about. For households, the goal of the model is to
deliver predictions of how much people will consume and work
at different dates and under different circumstances, and what
prices they will face. For firms, it’s often how much they will
produce and invest.
How big is a typical DSGE model?
They’re small in the sense that I can describe a model to you in
five or six equations. For most models, a single page would
summarize them, and their solutions can be obtained in min-
utes, if not seconds, on many computers. They’re big in the
sense that they presume that individual actors are acting as if
they perform fantastically complicated computations. The old
“non-equilibrium” models were actually much bigger. The
internal consistency required of the current models makes
their computation grow rapidly more demanding as they get
“larger” and has so far prevented most of them from getting
too big. 
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think his publication has spurred the leading journal editors
to reexamine their product. What he thinks is that his jour-
nal’s very existence and continued financial and intellectual
support is testament to the willingness of the economics
discipline to embrace new and improved ideas. And while
the field of economics in 2008 may not have its own Milton
Friedman, Klein thinks it’s a good sign that more people are
at least talking about the absence of such a figure.
He says: “Clearly today there is more empirical work
going on, and I think model building has come down a
notch; so-called theory is continuing to come down in 
prestige and that’s a good thing … so I think that I’m ready
to believe that things are getting better. I sure hope so.”
If economics is itself a market, then the best models
should rise to the top. Today, there are more ways to perco-
late new ideas than ever — from a widening array of
journals, to blogs, to curricula in college classrooms, and to
a surprising run of New York Times best-selling economics
books. Then again, the process of rising can take some time. 
In 1970, it would have been difficult to find an economist
who believed the Keynesian paradigm would be dead 10
years later. As for today’s paradigm? Perhaps we’ll know in 
10 more years. RF
The way economists are trained has come a long way in the




major in economics, once as popular as an 8 a.m.
lecture, lately finds itself in high demand. Univer-
sities across the nation report a growing number
of undergraduates entering their programs in economics.
At the graduate level, competition for admission to the
top schools is just plain brutal. 
Let’s turn to the empirical evidence: According to the
Digest of Education Statistics, the number of economics
majors at U.S. universities jumped 22.5 percent between 2001
and 2006; the number of master’s students was up 37.5, while
the number of doctorates grew by a much tamer but still
strong 9.3 percent. To be sure, an economics degree is by no
means dominant on most campuses — it still represents only
about 1.6 percent of all bachelor degrees conferred in the
United States. On the other hand, growth in an economics
degree is almost 4 percentage points higher than total
degrees. And the popularity of economics appears to have
come at the expense of some other traditionally popular
degrees — the number of sociology bachelors, for example,
actually dropped 5.7 percent between 2001 and 2006.
And now, in the parlance of the discipline, some stylized
facts from the Fifth Federal Reserve District, which reaches
from South Carolina to Maryland: At Duke University, one
in four undergraduates majors in economics. At George
Mason University, applications skyrocketed after faculty
member Vernon Smith won the Nobel Prize in economics.
Clemson’s pool of economics majors has increased 65 per-
cent in the past four years alone; Wake Forest University’s
doubled in just the past year.
But don’t get carried away. For while it’s true that eco-
nomics is enjoying a period of perhaps unsurpassed
popularity on college campuses, there is no shortage of ques-
tions about its direction. Chiefly, some faculty members
worry that the core curriculum — particularly at the gradu-
ate level — is becoming too technical, too theoretical, and
fails to address relevant policy questions. A Ph.D. program
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